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Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the

Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Before Final Judgment
Dan B. Dobbs*
I. THE PROBLEM OF BELATED DIRECT ATTACK UPON
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Good judicial administration requires that all issues pre-

liminary to the merits of a dispute be raised and disposed of at
an early stage of litigation. It would be farcical to try a case
fully on the merits and then decide demurrers, objections to
venue, or motions to strike inappropriate pleadings afterwards.
Since the law is "a ass" only part of the time, it ordinarily requires that all defenses and objections be raised at the beginning
of the trial and not at the end or in the middle; and if posFor
sible, these preliminary objections are decided first.'
example, if the defendant believes that the court has no jurisdiction over his person, he must say so immediately if he appears in the case at2 all; if he does not object immediately, he
waives his objection.
It is commonly said, however, that parties cannot consent
to jurisdiction of the subject matter; 3 accordingly, the issue of
subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even for the first time on appeal.4 Thus, failure
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Professor
of Law, University of North Carolina.
1. Federal practice is prescribed in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h). The 1966 amendments, however, make it easy to
postpone decision on preliminary questions. Likewise, if evidence introduced without objection raises a new point, under the liberal amendment rules, a failure to raise the point earlier may carry no adverse
consequences. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b). If a cause of action is not stated

in the complaint, it may be attacked tardily. See LOUISELL & HAzARD,
PLEADING & PROCEDURE 197-98 (1962); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (2).

2. FED. R. Civ. P. 12; see Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S.
25 (1917); York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890). Similarly the plaintiff may
be held to have waived any objections to jurisdiction over his person
because he has, by filing his complaint, submitted to the court's jurisdiction. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
3. See 1 BARRoN & HOLTZoFr, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 21
(Wright ed. 1960); 1 MOORE, FEDRAL PRACTICE f 0.60(4) (2d ed. 1959);
Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C.L. REV. 49 (1961).
4. This statement is made repeatedly by both courts and writers,
without qualification. The leading case is Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v.
Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884), discussed in detail below. This paper, how-
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to raise this fundamental issue at the beginning of the litigation
is not a waiver-so it is said-for there can be no waiver. On
this theory, a court will dismiss a case that has been fully tried
on the merits when either party thereafter objects to the jurisdiction, 5 or may dismiss on its own motion.6 This means that a
defendant-or a plaintiff in a removed case-may say nothing
about the absence of jurisdiction until he sees the verdict. If it
is favorable, he will maintain a truly golden silence. If it is
unfavorable, he will object to the court's jurisdiction and demand
that the verdict be set aside and the case dismissed. 7 In oldfashioned terminology, this is morally wrong. It is unfair to the
winning party. After all, he has won on the merits, and a jurisdictional defect seldom affects the fairness of the trial. 8 Moreover, it may deprive the winning party of any chance for a trial
at all, as where the statute of limitations has run when the dismissal occursY Further, it is bad administration of justice; it is
inefficient as well as unfair, and it quite properly raises grave
public doubts about the judicial system. 10 The best thing that
ever, attempts to show that the statement is accurate only in certain well
defined situations. See § II1. D. infra.
5. E.g., Page v. Wright, 116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1950); Mayhew v.
Mayhew, 376 S.W.2d 324 (Tenn. App. 1963).
6. E.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951);
Landry v. Cornell Constr. Co., 87 R.I. 4, 137 A.2d 412 1957). Federal
decisions usually speak of a duty of the court to raise the jurisdictional
issue. E.g., Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 588 (1939); St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 287, n.10 (1938). State
courts often say only that they "may" or "can" raise the jurisdictional
issue at any time on their own motion. E.g., Masone v. Zoning Bd., 148
Conn. 551, 172 A.2d 891 (1961); Landry v. Cornell Constr. Co., supra.
7. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, supra note 6. This has
been a point of judicial concern for over 300 years. See Coke's remarks
in The Admiralty Case, 12 Co. Rep. 77, 77 Eng. Rep. 1355 (K.B. 1610).
But no one except the dissenters in Finn, who thought that jurisdiction
could be given by estoppel, has attempted to do anything about it.
8. Where exclusive jurisdiction is allocated to one tribunal in
order to take advantage of its special expertise, it may be said that a
trial in a different and less expert court is to some extent unfair, since
the parties did not benefit from the expertise of the proper tribunal.
This might conceivably be the case, for example, where exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices is allocated to the NLRB. See San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Even in this
kind of case, however, there is no fundamental lack of fairness.
9. This was the situation in Di Frischia v. New York Cent. Ry., 279
F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960). The court in that case, however, refused to
follow the accepted general rule and held that the trial court should
proceed, even in the absence of jurisdiction. The case is discussed in
more detail below. See text accompanying notes 67-90 infra. The American Law Institute has proposed a statutory change to take care of
this situation. See § III. infra.
10. See ALI, STuDY OF THE DivisioN OF JuRIsDIcTIoN BETWEEN STATE
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can be said for such procedures is that they are slightly more
civilized than the Queen's procedure in Alice, where the Queen
required "sentence first-verdict afterwards"; 1 we require "verdicts first, sentence never."
Happily, not all courts have engaged in such foolishness,
though most courts have said they do. The Supreme Court has
denied collateral attack upon judgments rendered without jurisdiction; 2 it has also held that in certain circumstances the jurisdictional issue may be foreclosed in comparatively early stages
of the case.' 3 However, many courts have not recognized the
Supreme Court's holdings and appear to be under the impression that they are required to entertain jurisdictional objections
4
at any stage of the case.1
This article attempts to survey the limits of the doctrines
which permit parties to raise jurisdictional issues belatedly, and
to point out that the federal courts have sometimes permitted
such procedure where they are not required to do so. It should
be reiterated that this discussion deals with problems of belated
assertion of a defect in subject matter jurisdiction, not with a
defect in jurisdiction over the defendant's person, which can be
waived and must be timely asserted. Throughout the following
discussion, it is assumed that the only objection to jurisdiction is
to the power of the court to act on the kind of case involvedfor example, the requisite amount in controversy is not involved,
or the parties are of the same citizenship. 5
AND FEDERAL CoumTs 106 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, April 19, 1965);
1 MooaR, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.60(4), at 610 (2d ed. 1959).
11. CARRoLL, ALcIC 3x WONDERLAND, ch. 12, p. 161 (The Annotated

Alice, Gardner ed. 1960).
12. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S.
371 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938); Dowell v. Applegate,
152 U.S. 327 (1894); Des Moines Nay. & R.R. v. Iowa Homestead Co.,
123 U.S. 552 (1887). The same rule, of course, applies where the defect
in jurisdiction is one of jurisdiction over the person rather than jurisdiction of the subject matter, American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S.
156 (1932), and where the defect is one going to jurisdiction over the
defendant's property in a quasi in rem suit. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S.
106 (1963).
13. Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Pinkney, 149 U.S. 194 (1893); Hartog v.
Memory, 116 U.S. 588 (1886), both discussed below. See text accompanying notes 91-109 infra.
14. See Albert v. Brownell, 219 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1955); Page v.
Wright, 116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940); Ambassador East, Inc. v. Orsatti,
155 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Pa. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 257 F.2d 79 (3d
Cir. 1958). A great many cases state the rule without actually rendering
such a broad holding.
15. A court is said to be without jurisdiction of the subject matter
or to lack competency when it has not been given power to hear the type
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II. DOCTRINES REQUIRING TIMELY ASSERTION OF
JURISDICTIONAL OBJECTIONS
A. THE

BOOTSTRAP

PRInCiPLE

The bootstrap doctrine 0 normally operates to foreclose a
collateral attack upon the jurisdiction of a court that has rendered a final judgment. 17 Its premise is that every court has
jurisdiction to decide its own jurisdiction, unless the legislature
has decreed otherwise.:' When a court has jurisdiction to decide
an issue, it has the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly.:9
Even if its decision in favor of its own jurisdiction is erroneous,
it is valid. It may be reversed on appeal, but if an appeal is
not taken, the decision stands, and is binding, erroneous or not.
The second half of the bootstrap doctrine premises that any unappealed decision, on the jurisdictional issue or otherwise, is res
judicata in subsequent litigation. Since the trial court has juxisdiction to decide its own jurisdiction, its decision is not void
but is, on the contrary, res judicata, unless policies of res
judicata indicate otherwise.20 As a result, the issue of jurisdicof case involved. However, courts have no fixed approach to characterization of cases into type, so that a great many defects are said to be
defects in subject matter jurisdiction, even when the court obviously
has jurisdiction over the general type of action involved. Thus, federal
courts have jurisdiction over contract cases, but unless there is diversity
or a federal question together with the requisite amount in controversy,
there is still a defect in subject matter jurisdiction. See Dobbs, Trial
Court Erroras an Excess of Jurisdiction,43 TExAs L. REV. 854 (1965).
16. The term apparently derives from the catchline of a Note in 53
HAnv. L. REv. 652 (1940). If it fails to achieve suitable dignity, it is at
least expressive and considerably surpasses the wit normally uncovered
in that august tome. The implication is, of course, that the trial court
by deciding that it had jurisdiction, pulled itself up by its own bootstraps.
17. See cases cited note 12 supra.
18. See Kalb v. Fuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). This case is often
interpreted as creating a judicial exception to the bootstrap principle
when policy is strong against the court's acting beyond its jurisdiction.
Cf. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942). But it appears to be simply
a case in which Congress deprived state courts of the power they normally have-that is, the power to decide their own jurisdiction.
19. See the late Professor Chafee's excellent discussion of this idea
in his book, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQuITY, 296-380 (1950). The cases are,
verbally at least, in complete accord. E.g., State ex rel. Ruffing v.
Jameson, 80 S.D. 362, 123 N.W.2d 654 (1963).
20. Since res judicata is a doctrine reflecting judicially created
policy, it is not applied where sound policy reasons dictate a second full
trial. See Dobbs, supra note 15, at 882-90. Thus in United States v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940), the Court held that
the normal bootstrap principle would not foreclose a collateral attack
for lack of jurisdiction where there was a defect in jurisdiction over the
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tion normally can be settled by a final judgment, at least to the
extent that the jurisdictional issue cannot be raised again on
collateral attack.2 1
Important as the bootstrap doctrine is, it has its limits.
Since res judicata applies only when a "final judgment" is rendered and not before, 22 the traditional rule that permits parties
to raise jurisdictional issues at any time operates until such a
judgment is rendered. In short, the bootstrap doctrine does not
require a party to assert his jurisdictional objection seasonably; it
requires only that he assert it before a final judgment is rendered,
or on appeal. It is thought to bar a collateral, but not a direct
23
attack.
Possibly the bootstrap principle does not even operate on
all final judgments. In both state and federal court systems,
there are statutory 24 or equitable 25 procedures that permit post
trial review of final judgments by the trial court, even after
time for appeal has expired. Under these procedures, many of
which are modeled on Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules, 26 a
party may move to reopen the case after a final judgment when
one of several specified grounds is shown. In this manner really
egregious blunders may be corrected and gross unfairness eliminated. This sort of safety valve procedure is useful, though
only rarely, and is usually limited in two ways. The case can
be reopened only when certain specific grounds 27 are shownsovereign, since to hold otherwise would in effect permit local government attorneys to waive sovereign immunity.
21. The bootstrap principle may not have the effect of preventing
a direct attack (by motion in the original action), even after a final
judgment. It was so held in In re Stern, 235 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y.
1964). But see Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494 (1941), and
note 38 infra.
22. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGVENTS §§ 41, 68 (1942); 1B MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE J 0.409, 0.441, 0.443 (2d ed. 1965).
23. The court so held in In re Stern, 235 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
24. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 473; MAss. GEN. LAWS AN. ch. 250,
§§ 14-15 (1956).
25. As to equitable relief, see generally RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS
§§ 112-30 (1942).

FEDERAL RuLE 60(b) specifically authorizes indepen-

dent equitable relief for fraud, apart from the motion provided for by
the rule. Some state statutes providing for relief from judgments may
provide the exclusive remedy, since state statutes seldom explicitly preserve preexisting rights to equitable relief.
26. E.g., Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02; MIN.

R. Civ. P. 60.02.

27. Most commonly these include fraud, mistake, newly discovered
evidence or "voidness" of the judgment, but there is a good deal of variation, and even statutes modeled on the federal rules do not always
recognize all of these grounds without qualification. E.g., Ky. R. Civ. P.
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fraud, for example-and then only within stated time limits. 8
Federal Rule 60(b) provides such a procedure, and when the
ground asserted is that the "judgment is void," the motion may
be made without time limit. On the basis of this rule, it has been
held that a tardy jurisdictional attack can be launched even
after final judgment, on the ground that if there were no jurisdiction, the judgment was "void" and thus came squarely within
the permissive doctrine of 60(b) .29 In this view, the bootstrap
principle has no application, even to a final judgment, or if it
does, it is overpowered by 60 (b).
Such a view may be correct. The bootstrap principle is
usually thought to operate on the basis of res judicata, and res
judicata comes into play only when there is a final judgment and
a collateral attack-that is, when there is a second and distinct
suit. Since a motion under Rule 60 (b) is a motion in the original suit and is thus a direct attack, there is no res judicata involved and the issue of jurisdiction cannot be foreclosed by that
doctrine.
But the bootstrap principle is that the trial court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. Once it renders a final
judgment, it has either expressly or impliedly decided that it
has jurisdiction.3 0 Having decided a point that is within its
power to decide, that decision is valid even if erroneous. If it is
valid, it is not "void," and if it is not "void," then Rule 60 (b) may
not authorize a post-judgment attack. This reasoning, it must
be emphasized, is not usually followed and to some it will seem
spurious.3 1 Nevertheless, it has backing in the Supreme Court's
decision in the Mine Workers case.3 2 In that case a federal dis60.02, in effect recognizes only "extrinsic" fraud, while Rule 60(b) of
the federal rules allows vacation of the judgment for any kind of fraud.
28. Under Rule 60(b), the motion must be made within a reasonable time regardless of the ground asserted; when the ground is mistake,
new evidence, or fraud, it must be made within one year. State statutes
vary as to time limits, but one year is common. E.g., MAss. Gm . LAws
AiN. ch. 250, § 15 (1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-220 (1953).
29. In re Stern, 235 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
30. An implied decision by a court that it has jurisdiction normally
is sufficient to invoke the bootstrap principle, and the fact that a court
acts on the merits implies a finding or conclusion that it has jurisdiction.
See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371
(1940).
31. A great many cases say, rather loosely, that a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is "void." Certainly this is the traditional
view, but if the bootstrap principle is accepted-as it must be in federal
courts-then it would seem that the trial court's decision on the jurisdictional issue itself is not void. Nor would the judgment be void in the
sense that a collateral attack would be permitted.
$2, United States v. IJMW, 3$0 U,, 258 (1947).
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trict court enjoined a strike in spite of a statute that specifically
said it had "no jurisdiction" to do so. Mr. Lewis, who had been
so enjoined, violated the injunction and was charged, along with
his union, with contempt of court. His defense was that the
court had no jurisdiction. It had always been an accepted defense to a contempt charge.3 3 The Supreme Court held, however,
that even though the trial court may not have had jurisdiction
to issue a permanent injunction, it did have jurisdiction to decide its own jurisdiction. (This will be called "incipient" jurisdiction for convenient reference.) This incipient jurisdicton,
34
like plenary jurisdiction, can be protected from destruction.
Specifically, the Court held it could be protected by an injunction aimed at preserving the status quo long enough to decide
the issue of plenary jurisdiction. The injunction was therefore
valid and could not be disobeyed with impunity.
Mine Workers establishes that res judicata is not always a
requirement of the bootstrap doctrine, since res judicata was in
no manner involved in the case. The trial court did not decide
the issue of jurisdiction, even tacitly, and without a decision on
the point there could be no res judicata. Indeed, the trial court's
decree-a temporary restraining order-was final only in a
limited sense, 35 and certainly was not based upon an adversary
proceeding.3" These reasons alone might justify a refusal to ap33. E.g., Ex parte Bryant, 155 Tex. 219, 285 S.W.2d 719 (1956); see
Cox, The Void Order and the Duty To Obey, 16 U. Cm. L. REV. 86 (1948);
Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950).
34. Although Congress has prohibited federal court injunctions
against state court proceedings, for example, it has expressly reserved
the power of federal courts to protect their own jurisdiction by injunction. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). State courts also protect their jurisdiction
by injunction. E.g., Wehrhane v. Peyton, 134 Conn. 486, 58 A.2d 698
(1948); Thurston v. Thurston, 256 N.C. 663, 124 S.E.2d 852 (1962).
35. A judgment must be final to support an appeal in many circumstances, and it must be final to support res judicata. There is a
broad tendency to assume that what is final for one of these purposes
is also final for the other. A temporary restraining order, as distinct
from a preliminary injunction, is not ordinarily appealable under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1964). Austin v. Altman, 332 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1964).
On this basis, the order in Mine Workers was probably not final even in
the sense that it would support an appeal. Clearly it was not final in
the sense that it would bind the trial court on final hearing. It is possible that an appeal from a temporary restraining order would be heard,
notwithstanding the usual rule to the contrary, where there is a chance
that if it is not heard, the issue will become moot. Woods v. Wright, 334
F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964) (denial of temporary restraining order reviewed;
if nonappealable, decision might become moot). On the meaning of
finality generally, see 1B MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.409(1) (2d ed.
1964).
36. There is no generally stated requirement that a judgment must
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ply res judicata; the absence of a decision on the jurisdictional
point most assuredly precludes its use. 37 More importantly, there
was simply no need for res judicata in Mine Workers. The bootstrap premise, that the court has power to determine its own jurisdiction, is followed by the premise that it could protect that
incipient jurisdiction, not by the premise that its decision is binding in a colleteral attack.
If the same reasoning is followed in motions after final
judgment under Rule 60(b), it could be said that when the trial
court has jurisdiction to decide its own jurisdiction, any judgment it renders is not void at all, but is at most erroneous and
reversible upon appeal only. Mine Workers is not direct authority for a 60(b) case; but it does establish that res judicata is
not necessary to application of the bootstrap principle, and there
seems no real reason to distinguish a post-judgment attack on
jurisdiction made by motion from a post-judgment attack made
in a separate suit. Rule 60 (b) and analogous state statutes serve
a good purpose in permitting correction of mistakes that go to
the essential fairness of the proceeding; but jurisdictional defects have nothing to do with fairness. By hypothesis, the parties got a fair trial; if they did not, they may have the judgment
set aside for mistake or fraud. The only reason for permitting
a post-judgment attack on jurisdiction under Rule 60(b) is to
permit the parties to do directly what they may do indirectly by
a collateral attack. Where the parties cannot collaterally attack
a judgment for lack of jurisdiction-which is the usual case in
federal courts under the bootstrap doctrine-there is no reason
to permit a belated direct attack under Rule 60 (b).
A number of federal and state decisions lend support to this
view. 8 However, even if the jurisdictional issue is foreclosed
result from an adversary proceeding in order to have collateral estoppel
effect. However, in a number of instances, a nonadversary proceeding
may be denied effect. Professors Moore and Currier advocate a general
view to this effect where default or consent judgments are involved. See
1B MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE I 0.444(1), at 4002 (2d ed. 1965). A different view is that collateral estoppel effect ought to be denied as to jurisdictional issues where there is no opportunity for adversary litigation.
See Handler, Juvenile Courts and the Adversary System, 1965 Wis. L.
REv. 7.
37. Not only must there be a decision on an issue before the judgment is binding with respect to that point, but the decision must be clear.
If the decision is unnecessary to the disposition of the case, e.g., Schofield v. Rideout, 233 Wis. 550, 290 N.W. 155 (1940), or if the precise
dimensions of the decision are uncertain, Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S.
464 (1958), neither party is bound with respect to that particular point.
38. See Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494 (1941). In that
case, the government, having lost in the trial court, launched a direct
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after final judgment and cannot be reopened under Rule 60(b),
it is perfectly clear that the bootstrap principle does not affect
the right of the parties to attack jurisdiction at any time before
final judgment is rendered, or even after judgment by raising
the issue for the first time on appeal. The bootstrap principle
is, then, quite a valuable tool in stopping wasteful litigation,
but at best it operates only after a judgment has been rendered
and time for appeal has expired. If the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction is to be foreclosed at any reasonable stage of litigation, other doctrines must be resorted to.
B. LAW OF THE CASE mN LAW OF THE TmAiL
A doctrine similar to the doctrines of res judicata is known
as the doctrine of "law of the case."'39 Under the rules of law
of the case, when an appellate court has decided an issue on an
appeal, it will normally not reconsider the issue if there is a
second appeal in the same case. 40 This is not the rule of res
judicata, because the same case is involved, not a different one.
The law of the case rules are more flexible than those of res
judicata, because the policies against relitigation are not as
strong.41 As a result, most courts will reexamine a wrongly
decided question on a second appeal whenever there appears to
attack by motion nine years later. The Supreme Court treated this as
if it were a collateral attack, holding that the trial court's jurisdictional
decisions established its jurisdiction. See also Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf,
C. & S. Ry., 270 U.S. 266 (1926); First Nat'l Bank v. Klug, 186 U.S. 202
(1902); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Taussig, 255 F.2d 765 (7th
Cir. 1958) (also discussing acquiescence and acceptance of benefits of
judgment). But see Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S.
348 (1920) (direct attack permitted). In Hogg v. Peterson, 198 N.E.2d
767 (Ind. 1964) an adoption was granted in 1955; in 1960, a direct attack
was made on the adoption decree and it was set aside. The natural
parents then brought habeas in another court to gain custody of the
children. The second court refused to grant habeas on the ground that
the decree was originally rendered with jurisdiction and should not have
been set aside. This was affirmed. The court said that the direct attack,
coming long after the term of the original decree "amounted to a collateral attack" and that the issue of jurisdiction was res judicata. In
New Jersey v. American Can Co., 42 N.J. 32, 198 A.2d 753 (1964), a
direct attack was denied explicitly on the ground that res judicata
policies and bootstrap applied to a belated direct attack.
0.404 (2d ed. 1965).
39. See generally 1B MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE II
40. See, e.g., Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Blackwell, 291 S.W.
2d 539 (Ky. 1956); Chandler v. Lafferty, 282 Pa. 550, 128 Atl. 507 (1925).
41. See Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Blackwell, supra note 40.
Even courts purporting to apply law of the case as an "iron rule," in
fact treat it as a plastic one when they wish to do so. Compare Porter v.
Hanley, 10 Ark. 186 (1849), with American Ry. Express Co. v. Davis, 158
Ark. 492, 250 S.W.540 (1923).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:491

be a substantial reason for doing so. Law of the case is seldom42
applied to issues that were not raised at all on the first appeal,
even where they could and should have been raised. Law of the
case, then, resembles a very flexible48 sort of collateral estoppel
more than it resembles merger or bar.
A variation of law of the case might be called "law of the
trial." Many trial courts are staffed with two or more judges.
All cases involve various stages, and, if the judges are used effectively, it is likely that Judge I will determine some motions and
Judge II will determine others. If Judge I rules against a party
on a motion, that party may find a way to raise the same issue
again before Judge IT, either by presenting the same motion
again or by injecting the same issue in a new guise. In such
situations, Judge II is usually wise to avoid overruling his
colleague. Good judicial administration requires that two judges
in the same court do not constantly overrule one another. Appellate courts have recognized this and usually insist that Judge
I's decision is final and not subject to reexamination by Judge
Ir. 4 4 If it is wrong, it can be reversed on appeal. Since no such
policy requires Judge I to follow his own decision on a matter, 45
he may reverse himself at a later stage of the case if he decides
he was in error. However, as a practical matter he cannot rule
twice on every issue, and he is likely to refuse reconsideration
of former rulings. Like the law of the case rules, these rules
are flexible, and in compelling circumstances or when the reasons
46
for them no longer exist, they may not be followed.
42. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 255 U.S. 129 (1921); Hayes v.
City of Wilmington, 243 N.C. 525, 91 S.E.2d 673 (1956). Contra, Lowe
v. City of Atlanta, 194 Ga. 317, 21 S.E.2d 171 (1942); Drummond v.
Drummond, 414 Pa. 548, 200 A.2d 887 (1964). See also Skillern v. May,
10 U.S. (6Cranch) 267 (1810).
43. Merger and bar apply when the cause of action in Suit I and
the cause of action in Suit II are identical, and these rules foreclose not
only issues that were decided but all that could have been decided.
Collateral estoppel applies when the causes of action in Suits I and II
are different, and forecloses only issues that were actually litigated.
There are many discussions of the distinction. See, e.g., 1B MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE I 0.405, 0.441 (2d ed. 1965).
44. See, e.g., Price v. Greenway, 167 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1948); Davis
v.Singleton, 259 N.C. 148, 130 S.E.2d 10 (1963).
45. In Dictograph Prods. Co. v. Sonotone Corp., 230 F.2d 131, 134
(2d Cir. 1956), Judge Learned Hand said: "No one will suggest that the
first judge himself may not change his mind and overrule his own order
...... But in Keel v. Anderson, 104 Ga. App. 296, 121 S.E.2d 505 (1961),
the court said that it would not even permit the trial judge to overrule
himself. It is difficult to make-sense of the latter view.
46. See, e.g., Dictograph Prods. Co. v. Sonotone Corp., supra note 45
(excellent discussion by Judge Learned Hand). See generally 1B MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE f

0.404(4) (2d ed. 1965).
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These rules have very little power to force an early assertion
of jurisdictional defects. In Price v. Greenway, 7 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit pointed out that the rules of law
of the trial justified Judge I's refusing to reconsider a jurisdictional issue decided earlier by Judge I. But the court recognized its duty as an appellate court to review the evidence on
the point, regardless of whether the issue was decided by Judge
I or Judge II or both, and it is clear that law of the trial has no
permanent effect upon the jurisdictional issue. The rules merely
require that trial judges not overrule one another; they do not
foreclose appellate consideration of the issue.
However, courts have sometimes applied law of the case not
only to issues that were decided on a former appeal, but -also to
issues that could have been, but were not, presented and decided. 48 Although the Supreme Court has disapproved such an
application of law of the case for nonjurisdictional issues, 49 it has
itself so applied the doctrine to a jurisdictional issue. In Skiecrn
v. May,50 there was a trial in a partition action and review in
the Supreme Court, which remanded with an order that the
land involved be partitioned. On remand, the trial court discovered that no jurisdiction had been alleged, so that on the face
of the record jurisdiction was absent, at least by federal standards.51 The trial judge certified a question to the Supreme
Court, in response to which the trial court was instructed to
carry out the mandate of the Supreme Court on the former review, "although the jurisdiction of that court be not alleged.
... 2 The Court did not use the term "law of the case" .although this is obviously an application of the doctrine, and
equally obviously, the Court was giving it a scope not normally
approved, since the jurisdictional issue had not been presented
or litigated on the former appeal. The scope of the decision in
Skillern is doubtful. The short, almost cryptic, opinion of the
Court may mean that law of the case applies to jurisdictional
issues not explicitly decided only on the narrow facts of Skillern
47. 167 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1948).
48. See Lowe v. City of Atlanta, 194 Ga. 317, 21 S.E.2d 171 (1942);
Fidelity-Baltimore Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 217 Md. 367, 142 A.2d 796 (1958). In both cases the ultimate
issue involved was decided on the former appeal and the courts refused
merely to examine new theories going to that issue on the second appeal.
Very real dangers do exist, however, as illustrated in Manley, "Law of
the Case" as a Pitfall, 34 CoRNmEL L.Q. 397 (1949).
49. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 255 U.S. 129 (1921).
50. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 267 (1810).
51. See, e.g., Mansfield, C. &L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884).
52. Skillern v. May, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 267, 268 (1810).
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itself. It may be that if the record affirmatively shows a lack
of jurisdiction, as where it shows that both parties in a purported
diversity action are actually citizens of the same state, a different rule would apply and the jurisdictional issue would remain open.53 There does not seem to be much intrinsic merit in
approach, but it is left open by the Skillern
such a narrow
4
decision.

In Drummond v. Drummond, 5 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court similarly applied the law of the case doctrine to unlitigated jurisdictional issues.56 On a second appeal, the defendant
urged a jurisdictional objection he had not presented on an
earlier appeal. "[E]ven though facts were elicited on trial that
may tend to indicate that those [jurisdictional] prerequisites
53. In In re Stern, 235 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), Stern was held
guilty of contempt and appealed. The appellate court required a security
deposit as a condition to hearing the appeal. No such deposit was made
and the appeal was dismissed, even though the defendant was urging
a lack of jurisdiction. Thus the jurisdictional issue was not decided.
The defendant then moved in the trial court to set aside the orders
adjudging her in contempt. The trial court set aside its own contempt
orders on a finding that it was without jurisdiction. This lack of jurisdiction was plain on the face of the record. There was no mention of
Skillemn. If Skillern is inapplicable, is it because the jurisdictional defect in Stem appeared on the face of the record, or because there was
really no appeal at all? See also Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314

U.S. 63 (1941), where at an early stage of the litigation the trial court
re-aligned the parties according to their real interests in the case and

destroyed diversity. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed so as to
restore diversity. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Thereafter, the
case was tried on the merits. This time the Court granted certiorari to
consider the jurisdictional issue, that is, whether the parties were properly aligned. It concluded that the trial court had been correct in its
first action, and held there was no jurisdiction. It added: "And, of
course, this Court, by its denial of certiorari when the case was here
the first time, could not confer the jurisdiction which Congress has denied." Id. at 75. This, of course, is entirely compatible with Skillern.
54. The Skillern case also leaves open the effect of law of the case
on jurisdictional issues where there is no appeal at all. Almost certainly, however, the doctrine would not affect jurisdictional issues where
there is no appeal so as to preclude a trial judge from re-examining his
own decision, as in Century Transit Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp.
148 (D.N.J. 1954). And even if a second trial judge is precluded from
re-examining the decision of another trial judge of the same court, this
will not preclude appellate courts from examining the jurisdictional
issue. Price v. Greenway, 167 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1948).
55. 414 Pa. 548, 200 A.2d 887 (1964).
56. The Pennsylvania court characterized the issues as jurisdictional, following its own prior views in this respect. Many courts no
doubt would agree, but it must be pointed out that some academic writers, at least, would take the position that the issues involved were not
jurisdictional at all. See Dobbs, Trial Court Error as an Excess of Jurisdiction, 43 TExAs L. REV. 854 (1965).
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were lacking [t] he defendant is .

.

. barred from raising this

issue in this appeal."57 This clearly goes beyond the Skillern
rule, for no facts in the record there-so far, at least, as the court's
opinion reflects-showed an absence of jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania court was willing to apply law of the case even though
facts in the record may have shown an absence of jurisdiction.
Perhaps some courts would reject these two cases. Not only
do most courts apply the law of the case doctrine flexibly,58 but
they hesitate to apply it at all to issues not actually litigated on
the first appeal. 9 Such views, when applied to substantive legal
or factual issues have a great deal of merit, but they are not
necessarily incompatible with the holdings in Skillern and Drummond. It may be reasonable to permit an appealing party to
assert a substantive issue on a second appeal (if he has made an
appropriate trial court record) even though he could also have
asserted the same issue on the first appeal.60 However, it is
equally reasonable to treat jurisdictional issues, which do not
affect the fairness of the trial, in a different fashion. Furthermore, a technical reason justifies the extension of law of the
case to unlitigated jurisdictional issues in the federal courts.
Since federal courts are obliged to consider jurisdiction on their
own motion when jurisdiction is not properly alleged,61 it can
be said that the jurisdictional issue is always at least tacitly
decided on the first appeal. An implied decision on the jurisdictional issue is a sufficient decision for purposes of res judicata,(2 and can be equally sufficient for purposes of law of the
case.
There is not much litigation involving these questions. If
the Drummond rule is followed in other courts-and it should
be followed-it will nevertheless have only the narrowest kind
of effect. It advances us toward eliminating belated objections
57. 414 Pa. 548, 551, 200 A.2d 887, 888-89 (1964).

58. See cases cited note 41 supra.
59. See cases cited note 42 supra.
60. Where, however, a party merely seeks to assert a new reason

or theory in support of a position on which he has previously lost, there
is not much to be said for permitting him to do so. See note 48 supra.
61. See Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804);
Mansfield C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884). A fortiori, the
court must raise the jurisdictional issue on its own motion when, though
allegations of jurisdiction are adequate, the record affirmatively demonstrates its absence, as where parties believe jurisdiction exists, but are
mistaken as to the law. See, e.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341

U.S. 6 (1951).
62. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S.
371 (1940).
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to subject matter jurisdiction, but only a very little way.
C.

WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND CONSENT

The established clich6 is that the parties may not consent to
jurisdiction of the subject matter.0 3 Waiver of a right-such as
a right to object to lack of jurisdiction-involves a knowing relinquishment.8 4 For this reason, it seems reasonably clear that
if parties cannot consent to jurisdiction, neither can they be
held to have waived their objections. Functionally the two
concepts are the same here. Estoppel resembles waiver, but is
distinct from it in that one may be estopped to assert a thing
without intending to be, and in that estoppel is not invoked unless there is prejudice to another party.65 rt is therefore conceivable that, although one may not consent to jurisdiction or
waive an objection to it, one might be estopped to assert the
jurisdictional defect. 66
In Di Frischiav. New York Cent. R.R., 67 the plaintiff brought
63.

See Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C.L.

REV. 49 (1961).

64. Souter v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 273 F.2d 921 (4th Cir.
1960); General Fin. & Guar. Co. v. Smith, 309 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958).
65. See, e.g., Upper Columbia River Towing Co. v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 313 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1963); Gullett v. Best Shell Homes, Inc., 312
F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1963); Hall v. Gulledge, 173 So.2d 571 (Ala. 1965)
(inconsistent position in another law suit not an estoppel since there
was no reliance or prejudice to present party).
66. This is not accepted doctrine. Where the jurisdictional defect
is apparent on the face of the record, the Supreme Court has refused to
apply estoppel to prevent objection to the jurisdictional defect. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951). However, a statement
I made elsewhere, see Dobbs, supra note 63, that estoppel and consent
are functionally equivalent is misleading. Estoppel and consent may be
functionally equivalent, but this is no answer to the problem. Functional equivalence does not mean legal equivalence, and there are many
instances in which the law carefully locks the front door, only to open
the back. This procedure often seems foolish, because entrance through
the back door is functionally equivalent to entrance through the front.
But it is not always as foolish as it seems. A housewife may lock the
front door to keep muddy children off a freshly cleaned floor, but she
may be perfectly willing to have them enter from the back. And if
they have already muddied the floor, there seems no point in pitching
them out again. The law may wish to lock the doors of the courts to
prevent entrance by consent, but at the same time permit the parties
to stay in court once entrance has been effected, at least if the entrance
was not in bad faith.
67. 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960), 15 U. IAb r L. REV. 315 (1961),
7 UTAH L. REV. 258 (1960). See also, on a similar decision, Comment,
38 NEB. L. REV. 1058 (1959). Both cases are discussed and approved in
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a diversity action in federal court. The defendant first objected
to the jurisdiction of the court, charging a lack of diversity, but
later withdrew his objection. For well over two years after the
suit was brought the parties engaged in various pretrial preparations. During this period the statute of limitations ran upon
the plaintiff's claim. After the statute of limitations had run,
the defendant renewed its objection to the court's jurisdiction by
moving to dismiss. The trial court, feeling itself bound to entertain a jurisdictional objection at any stage of the case, heard the
motion, concluded that diversity was absent, and dismissed. Reversing, the Third Circuit said that the trial court had abused its
discretion in hearing the belated motion to dismiss. Pointing
out that defendant had admitted the existence of diversity and
had participated in extensive pretrial preparations, the court
thought that "a further attempt to amend its answer to return
to its previous defense of lack of diversity could certainly not be
made as of right."0' s The court added: "A defendant may not
play fast and loose with the judicial machinery and deceive the
courts."0' 9 On similar facts a similar result had been reached
several years earlier by a federal district court.70 The Seventh71
and Fifth Circuits 72 and perhaps others 73 had still earlier ren-

dered decisions that gave some support to the decision. But
on the whole Di Frischia seemed to those who have written
about it-and perhaps to the court itself-a striking departure
from the accepted rules.7 4 This is understandable because the
court gave very little support for its decision. It recognized the
rule against jurisdiction by consent, announced that it did not
apply, and held, without explaining why, that the defendant
Stephens, Estoppel to Deny Federal Jurisdiction-Klee and Di Frischia
Break Ground, 68 DIcK. L. REv. 39 (1963).

68. 279 F.2d at 44.

69. Ibid.

70. Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
See Comment, 38 NEB. L. REV. 1058 (1959) criticizing this decision.
71. Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 949 (1950).
72. Murphy v. Sun Oil Co., 86 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied,

300 U.S. 683 (1937).
73. The Di Frischia court relied only upon the 5th and 7th Circuit

cases, supra notes 71 & 72, but the Supreme Court, as well as a majority
of the circuits, has said that a party may admit jurisdictional facts. See

the cases cited notes 96 & 124 infra.
74. See materials cited note 67 supra. The leading commentators,

Professors Moore and Wright, appear to agree that Di Frischia is a
departure from the norm. See 2A MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 1112.23
(Supp. 1966); 1 & IA Bonsox &HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE & PRocEDURE

§§ 21, 450 (Supp. 1966).
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could not raise the jurisdictional issue at such a belated stage
of the case.
Perhaps because the court did not adequately explain its decision, there has been some thought that it was based upon estoppel.7 5 It may have been. Certainly there is nothing unconstitutional about jurisdiction by estoppel.7 6 Yet the case itself
did not propound any such theory and, had it attempted to do so,
troublesome questions would have been provoked. Estoppel
should be no broader than the plaintiff's prejudice.7 7 It should
prevent the defendant from pleading the statute of limitations,
but it should not prevent him from attacking the court's jurisdiction. Indeed, had the case been dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the plaintiff probably could have maintained his action
in the state court, because the state court would have denied the
defendant the right to plead the statute of limitations under
these circumstances.7 8 If this is true, estoppel certainly has no
place in the Di Frischiadecision.
If, on the facts of Di Frischia,the state courts would refuse
to hear the plaintiff's claim, perhaps estoppel ought to be invoked if necessary, even though this might stretch the already
elastic concept of estoppel.7 9 At best, however, estoppel will
foreclose jurisdictional issues only in a very small percentage of
the cases. If no prejudice to the opposing party is shown, there
is no estoppel. 80 Prejudice to the administration of justice would
not, under any extension of estoppel now conceivable, be sufficient to foreclose the issue and prevent belated attacks upon
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the estoppel theory has a gross de75. See Stephens, supra note 67.
76. See text accompanying notes 139-44 infra.

77. See Baker v. Wood, 157 U.S. 212 (1895); May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb. 475, 17 N.W.2d 448 (1945) (estoppel is commensurate with
thing represented).
78. See OHio REv. CODE § 2305.19 (Anderson 1953): "[I]f the
plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits... the plaintiff... may
commence a new action within one year. . . ." A plaintiff whose federal suit was dismissed for lack of diversity was allowed to come under
the statute in Wasyk v. Trent, 174 Ohio St. 525, 191 N.E.2d 58 (1963),
33 U. Chic. L. REv. 113 (1964). The claim in Di Frischiaarose in Ohio,
so that his action clearly would not be barred in that state.
79. The American Law Institute has proposed providing for the
statute of limitations problem discussed here, not by estoppel, but by
statutory fiat. See ALI, STUDy OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTs 24-25 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
April 19, 1965). Courts do express willingness to stretch estoppel to fit
notions of justice, however. See, e.g., May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb.
475, 17 N.W.2d 448 (1945).
80. See cases cited note 65 supra.
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feet, for if there were any doubt about prejudice, a hearing
would have to be held on that issue. If prejudice were found,
estoppel could be invoked and the case could proceed to trial.
But this would mean a trial on the merits plus a trial on the
estoppel issue. Instead of minimizing litigation, the estoppel
theory might well increase it, so far as estoppel depends upon
proof of prejudice. Of course, on the facts of Di Frischia,the
prejudice to the plaintiff was quite clear and no additional hearing would have been required under the estoppel theory. However, on slightly different facts, the estoppel issue could well
provoke needless litigation. The conclusion to be drawn is that
estoppel was not the basis of the decision in Di Frischia, nor
should it have been. If estoppel may sometimes bar a party
from belated assertion of jurisdictional issues, well and good;
but it will seldom do so.
The bootstrap principle, the law of the case doctrines, and
estoppel all offer opportunities to foreclose jurisdictional issues
at some relatively early stage of litigation. But none of these
concepts is operative across the full range of need; none works
except in limited circumstances. And none, incidentally, will
explain the Di Frischiacase. Is there a broader basis for requiring timely assertion of jurisdictional defects to protect courts
and litigants from inefficiency and unfairness? Of course there
is. There is no reason why ordinary procedural rules cannot
apply to issues of jurisdiction so that objections not timely raised
are deemed waived. Both scholarly and judicial opinion grossly
exaggerate existing rules that permit tardy jurisdictional attacks,
and thus it becomes relevant to examine the exact scope of the
present rules.

D. PROCEDURAL RULES FORECLOSING TARDY JURISDICTIONAL
OBJECTIONS
1.

The Mansfield-Hartog Rules

The decision in Di Frischia,and a similar decision by another
federal court,81 aroused surprise and some disagreement.8 2 These
cases were thought to violate the traditional rule laid down by
the Supreme Court in Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan,8 3
which permitted a tardy jurisdictional attack. 84 On the basis of
the Mansfield decision, courts and writers have generally believed
81.
82.
83.
84.

Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
See materials cited note 67 supra.
111 U.S. 379 (1884).
See also Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804).
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that ordinary procedural rules have no application to issues of
jurisdiction, so that, while most issues must be raised in early
pleadings or by motion before answer,85 jurisdictional issues can
be raised at any time. However, the Mansfield rule does not
justify such a broad proposition, and in fact the Di Frischia
decision is quite consistent with the actual rule in Mansfield.
The Mansfield plaintiffs had filed a state court action against
corporate defendants. One of the plaintiffs was a citizen of Ohio,
as was one of the corporate defendants. The defendants removed the case to federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction
and sought to escape the obvious lack of diversity by alleging
in their removal petition that the Ohio plaintiff had left Ohio
and was now a citizen of some other state or territory unknown.
This was a defective allegation of citizenship because, as the
record showed, there was no diversity at the time the suit was
filed in state court.8 6 Furthermore, defendant's allegation was
insufficient because even if the plaintiff were no longer an Ohio
citizen, he might have been a citizen of one of the territories or
of Michigan, where some of the defendants were incorporated,
which would have destroyed diversity.8 7 No one noticed these
defects, however, and the case went to trial in the federal court.
Trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs in excess of $350,000.
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted the lack of diversity jurisdiction and ordered the trial court to vacate the judgment and
remand the case to state court.
Although Mansfield has frequently been erroneously cited as
supporting the rule that jurisdictional objections may be raised
at any time by the parties or by the courts, it holds simply and
narrowly that the question can be raised at any time when "the
want of jurisdiction appears affirmatively from the record.18 8
Some passages in the Court's opinion suggest that jurisdictional
objections can be raised at any time, not only when the want of
jurisdiction appears affirmatively from the record, but also
when there is neither pleading nor proof in the record supporting jurisdiction.8 9 But these passages are, on the facts, clearly
85. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
86. 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884).
87. Id. at 381.
88. Id. at 386.
89. Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804), supports the rule expressed in the Mansfield dicta. Most modern cases,
though they have not overruled Capron, in fact do not go beyond
Mansfield; that is, they require a tardy examination of jurisdictional
issues when the defect in jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the
record. See, e.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951);
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dicta. Even if they are not dicta, they formulate a rule considerably narrower than the rule usually stated today. If
Mansfield states the governing rule, then it is apparent that
Di Frischia is correct, or at least that it does not contravene
Mansfield. Recall that in Di Frischiathe defendant having admitted well-pleaded allegations of jurisdiction, there was record
support for the court's jurisdiction, and certainly the record did
not show affirmatively that jurisdiction was lacking. 0
Two years after Mansfield the Court decided Hartog v.
Memory9 ' which made the limits of the Mansfield rule abundantly clear. In that case the plaintiff clearly set up diversity
by alleging he was a citizen of Holland and defendant was a citizen of Illinois. Without suggesting any jurisdictional defect,
the defendant answered to the merits. During the trial, however, the defendant testified he was a citizen of Great Britain.
If this testimony was true-and defendant's use of the word
"citizen" rather than "subject" suggests it may be spuriousdiversity would have been destroyed, since the suit would have
been between two foreign nationals. 92 However, with the probable exception of defendant's counsel, no one appeared to appreciate the significance of this testimony and the trial proceeded
to a verdict for the plaintiff. Having lost on the merits, the
defendant then, for the first time, objected to the court's jurisdiction, pointing to the defendant's testimony as destroying diversity. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss,
but the Supreme Court reversed. Two alternative reasons were
United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226 (1938); United States v. Corrick,
298 U.S. 435 (1936); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237 (1934); Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306
U.S. 583 (1939), may go as far as Capron, since the absence of jurisdiction in Clark was not apparent on the face of the record and the Court
held merely that the allegation of jurisdiction was insufficient. Even
this case, however, may be consistent with the more limited rule in
Mansfield, for the Court may well have taken judicial notice that the
amount in controversy could not have been in excess of the minimum
then required. Capron is still the law. The point here is merely that
Capron has had very little application as a matter of fact.
90. The plaintiff in Di Frischia alleged that he was a citizen of
Pennsylvania and that the defendant railroad was incorporated in and
a citizen of New York. Defendant alleged it was also a citizen of Pennsylvania, but later stipulated to the contrary by agreeing to recognize
the jurisdiction and venue of the Pennsylvania District Court.
91. 116 U.S. 588 (1886).
92. Under the 1875 statute, 18 Stat. 470, § 1 (1875), diversity jurisdiction was granted in controversies "between citizens of a State and
foreign states, citizens, or subjects .... ." but not between two foreign
nationals. The present statute contains similar wording. 28 U.S.C. §
1332 (1964).
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given. One was that, regardless of any other rule that might be
involved, the plaintiff was entitled to have a hearing on the
jurisdictional facts and an opportunity to rebut defendant's surprise testimony.9 3 The other reason was that, once jurisdiction
had been appropriately pleaded, evidence controverting the jurisdiction could be received only if offered pursuant to a proper
objection to the jurisdiction. The parties, having failed to raise
the jurisdictional issue after the record showed the jurisdictional
facts, had no standing to do so during trial. The Court went
on to say that the trial judge should, in his discretion, permit a
party to amend pleadings if the judge suspects that his jurisdiction has been imposed upon by collusion or otherwise. Moreover, the judge could exercise his discretion to raise the issue
himself, although he is under no obligation to make a jurisdictional defect appear. In effect, the trial judge may, but need
not, permit a tardy objection to jurisdiction where the record
does not show affirmatively that jurisdiction is lacking. Only
when the record-by pleadings or by such amendments or proof
as the trial judge permits-affirmatively shows the want of jurisdiction is the judge required to permit a belated assertion of a
jurisdictional defect. Again, Di Frischiais not only consistent
with Mansfield, but is simply following Hartog.
It should not be surprising that crowded courts, working to
clear dockets, should be led to accept the broad, unadorned, and
quite erroneous statement that jurisdictional issues can be raised
at any time. Further, the Supreme Court gave some credence
to this view by its decision in Morris v. Gilmer."4 After his plea
of res judicata was overruled, defendant obtained leave of the
trial court to show a lack of diversity. It was shown that plaintiff, whose citizenship had been the same as defendant's, had
moved out of the state only temporarily and had not acquired
citizenship elsewhere. The facts tended to show, not collusion,
but a more or less deliberate fraud by the plaintiff in order to
gain federal jurisdiction, presumably because he had already
lost a similar claim in the state court. The Supreme Court held
that the jurisdictional issue could be considered and required a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. That was all it could hold,
because the trial court had given leave to the defendant to raise
93. In Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315 (1889), discussed below, the
Court said that this was the only holding in Hartog. However, this
statement is itself a dictum, and seems incorrect. The Hartog requirement of a hearing on the jurisdictional issue was an alternative holding,
but not the only holding.
94. 129 U.S. 315 (1889).
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the jurisdictional point-a power clearly resting in the trial
court under the Hartog rule. Had the trial court refused to
permit the tardy jurisdictional attack, the Court might have
made its holding broader, but the Hartog rule was not in issue.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court took this occasion to expound
on the problem of raising jurisdiction and in a series of dicta
criticized the Hartog rule. These dicta, if taken seriously, as
they were by some lower courts,95 would sabotage the judicial
system; they would extend the limited holding in Mansfield,
abolish the distinction that reconciled Mansfield and Hartog,
and destroy the long settled rule that parties could admit jurisdictional facts.9 6 Thus, the Morris dicta, had enormous potential, some of which has been realized in the lower courts, though
not in the Supreme Court itself. While Morris is not the last
word, it has been a misleading word contributing greatly to the
general misunderstanding of the rules about raising jurisdictional issues.
The dicta in Morris were not alone responsible for the prevalent misconception that jurisdiction could be attacked at any
9
time. The Court relied heavily on the Judiciary Act of 1875. 7
Most of the act-which was later codified as Section 80 of the
old Judicial Code and now survives in part in Rule 12(h) of the
Federal Rules 9k-was concerned with new and expanded removal provisions.99 Counterbalancing the expanded removal
rights granted by the act, section 5 provided if it
shall appear to the satisfaction of the said circuit [now federal
district] court, at any time [that the suit] does not really and
substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within
the jurisdiction of the said circuit court, or that the parties have
been improperly or collusively joined ... the said circuit court
shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or
remand it to the court from which it was removed ....

100

The Morris Court took the position, in dictum, that although
95. E.g., Page v. Wright, 116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940).
96. See Pittsburg, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Ramsey, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 322
(1875). See also United States v. Clarke (the Confiscation Cases), 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1874) (dictum) (not involving subject matter jurisdiction). Most of the courts of appeal decisions in contemporary
cases are in accord. See cases cited note 124 infra.
97. 18 Stat. 470, § 5 (1875).
98. The problem of collusive attempts to gain jurisdiction is covered presently in 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964). Federal Rule 12(h), which
deals with the time for raising jurisdictional issues, is discussed below.
See text accompanying notes 135-36 infra.
99. See 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE
0.71(4-3) (2d ed. 1964) for
discussion of the expanded removal provisions of the 1875 act.
100. 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
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before the 1875 Act, jurisdictional objections had to be raised
by pleas in abatement or not at all:101 the statute required a different result. The Court ignored the fact that both Mansfield
and Hartog were decided after the statute had been passed.
This statute, as interpreted in Morris, has been primarily responsible for the belief that jurisdiction may be attacked at any time,
even if the defect in jurisdiction does not show on the face of
the record.
The 1875 statute, however, does not bear such an interpretation. Once it is recognized that the Mansfield rule was established long before the statute was passed 10 2 and that it is a very
narrow rule indeed, it becomes apparent that the statute only
codified the rule that Mansfield expressed in final form. At
least, if the statute was intended to do more, it is an extraordinarily badly drafted work-which, it must be admitted, is the
case in any event. The statute requires the trial court to dismiss
when it appears to the satisfaction of the trial judge that jurisdiction is lacking. It is quite clear that the statute did not give
such authority to appellate courts, as the Supreme Court itself
recognized in Morris.03 The most likely construction of this
language would seem to be that Congress intended the trial
courts, as well as the appellate courts, to dismiss when jurisdictional defects appeared on the face of the record, but that it did
not intend to require anything more. Such an interpretation of
the statute would explain why the statute applies by its terms
only to trial courts.
This conclusion is borne out in other ways as well. The
statute is specifically addressed to two situations. It speaks of
one in which it appears that the suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute within the court's jurisdiction, and
it speaks also of one in which it appears that the parties have
been improperly or collusively joined. Although this may be
mere verbosity, rules of statutory construction demand that all
language in a statute be given meaning if possible.' 0 4 Why
then did Congress write of two situations-one in which jurisdiction appeared to be absent and one in which collusion ap101. E.g., Smith v. Kernochen, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 198, 216 (1849):
"The objection came too late, after the general issue. For when taken
to the jurisdiction on the ground of citizenship, it must be taken by a
plea in abatement, and cannot be raised in the trial on the merits."
102. Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804).
103. "[T]he Act of 1875 imposes upon the Circuit Court the duty of
dismissing ...." Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 326 (1889).
(Emphasis added.)
104, See, e.g., United States V,Menasche, 348 U.S, 528? 538-39 (1955).
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peared? If the parties collusively admitted or staged jurisdictional facts, wouldn't this be covered by the first portion of the
statute? If the statute was meant to cover both the situation in
which a lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appeared on the record
and the situation where it did not, it seems clear that the second
portion of the statute was quite unnecessary. But if the statute
was aimed only at the Mansfield situation, the first portion of
it would not cover collusion and a separate clause was needed
to do so. This is so because, if the parties collusively alleged
and admitted jurisdictional facts, the record would show jurisdiction existed, and under the Mansfield-Hartog rules (and the
earlier established rule that parties could admit jurisdictional
facts) there could be no tardy jurisdictional objection. The separate clause for the collusion situation thus makes sense on the
postulate that the statute, except for this clause, is aimed solely
at codifying the narrow rule in Mansfield. It is hard to see how
it makes much sense if the statute were intended to do more.
In addition to all this, the language of the statute itself at
least suggests the same conclusion and perhaps requires it. It
directs the trial judge to dismiss when it appears that jurisdiction is lacking. It does not say how this appearance is to take
place nor does it prescribe any procedural rules for raising the
issue. Thus it may be presumed that the normal procedural
rules would govern. In the light of prior law, the most reasonable conclusion would be that the jurisdictional defect was to
appear from the record-the pleadings, or such proof as the trial
judge admitted in his discretion. The statute certainly does not
contain the remotest suggestion that the parties have standing to
make a belated jurisdictional attack. Nor does it impose upon
the judge a duty to hear or initiate such an attack. What it
does is simple: when a jurisdictional defect does appear, the
judge must dismiss. There is no implication that the judge
must act to make the defect appear or that the parties may do
so other than by ordinary modes of procedure. This view of the
,statute, though not a common one today, is precisely the view
held by the Supreme Court in the Hartog case, which was decided some eleven years after the statute was passed. 10 5
The Mansfield-Hartog rules make it plain that if a lack of
jurisdiction appears on the face of the record, dismissal is required at any stage; but if it does not so appear, the trial judge
may exercise his discretion whether to permit amendments and
105. This view is even more clearly expressed in Mexican Cent. Ry.
v. Pinkney, 149 U.S. 194 (1893), discussed in more detail infra.
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proof that raise the issue after answer. Against these rules
were pitched a series of dicta in Morris and a grossly loose
construction of the 1875 statute. If, as concluded here, the statute does not compel a dismissal at any stage of the case unless
the defect appears on the record, it is apparent that the Mansfield-Hartogrules stand unless affected by subsequent authority.
The excruciating nonsense in Morris might, of course, have
petrified into law with the passage of time and simple repetition,
and for that reason these dicta cannot be disregarded. However,
just four years after that case, the Court specifically said in
Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Pinkney,10 6 that a party could not raise
jurisdictional objections in the course of trial without the trial
court's permission. Whatever standing the dicta in Morris might
have had, this is a clear return to Hartog. The Court pointed
out that the 1875 statute did not require any other result. Specifically, the statute did not require the judge to permit a tardy
jurisdictional objection. The issue in the case was cast as whether the trial court could refuse "leave to file a plea, during the
progress of the trial, on the question of plaintiff's citizenship
. ... ,"1To The Court's answer was cast in equally plain terms:
it is "well settled that mere matters of procedure ... are purely
discretionary matters for the consideration of the trial court
.... ,"108 On several other occasions after Morris-the last one in
1900-the Court approved the Hartog case.10 9 This seems to
leave the dicta in Morris as entirely spent forces.
The Supreme Court decisions of the twentieth century lead
to the same conclusion. A large number of them cite the Mansfield case, and at times the broad dictum is laid down that jurisdictional questions may be raised at any time, 10 but all of the
106. 149 U.S. 194 (1893).
107. Id. at 200-01.
108. Id. at 201.
109. See Huntington v. Laidley, 176 U.S. 668 (1900); Wetmore v.
Rymer, 169 U.S. 115 (1898).

110. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (opinion of Mr.
Justice Brennan); City of Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 277
U.S. 54 (1928). Even such dicta are rare in the Supreme Court decisions. Most of the Court's statements on the subject are precisely limited to the Mansfield rule. Thus in Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v.
Red Cab. Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938), the Court said that since the 1875
statute, it has been the duty of the trial courts
not only to act upon a motion to dismiss . . . or, if the state
practice permits, upon a denial of jurisdiction in the answer,
but to act sua sponte ... upon any disclosure, whether in
the pleadings or the proofs, which satisfies the court, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, that the plaintiff did not in
fact have a claim for the jurisdictional amount or value, and
knew, or reasonably ought to have known, that fact....
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cases citing Mansfield are cases applying the narrow rule in
Mansfield. Time and again the Court has permitted tardy jurisdictional objection where the lack of jurisdiction shows on
the face of the record, but the Court does not seem to have
gone any further than this. If the jurisdictional amount is not
sufficiently alleged, no answer of the defendant admits the jurisdictional amount, since there is nothing to admit."' The
same is true if neither diversity nor a federal question appears
in the record, in which case either a tardy objection or a sua
sponte dismissal is proper under Mansfield.1 1 2 And of course if
a federal question is alleged, but as a matter of law on the admitted facts the complaint does not raise a federal question, the
defect in jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the record.1 3 This
is equally true when as a matter of law diversity does not exist on
the facts pleaded." 4 In either case a tardy attack is permitted.
The parties may misapprehend the law: they may believe
that where complete diversity is lacking there is nevertheless a
separate and independent cause of action between two diverse
citizens that would justify removal; 1 5 or they may believe that
diversity exists because they have erroneously aligned the parties;" 6 or they may have concluded that diversity existed be7
cause they considered the citizenship of the wrong persons."
Id. at 287, n.10. It is perfectly clear from this statement that the Court
thought ordinary rules of practice could determine the time and manner
in which jurisdictional issues could be raised.
111. In Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939), where there
were several plaintiffs, a general allegation that the amount in controversy exceeded the required three thousand dollars was insufficient to
allege the jurisdictional amount, since the requirement is that each
plaintiff have such an amount involved. Stevens v. Nichols, 130 U.S.
230 (1889), held the allegation of diversity in present tense defective,
since it must appear on record that diversity existed at commencement
of the action.
112. See Continental Nat'l Bank v. Buford, 191 U.S. 119, 120 (1903)
(question arises upon the face of the record); Great So. Fire Proof
Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900); Peper v. Fordyce, 119 U.S. 469
(1886); Continental Ins. Co. v. Rhoads, 119 U.S. 237 (1886) (jurisdictional facts must appear on face of record); Thayer v. Life Ass'n of
America, 112 U.S. 717 (1885) (citizenship of party not on record; infer
it would prevent removal); Hancock v. Holbrook, 112 U.S. 229 (1884)
(diversity not on face of record in removal action; remand ordered).
113. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
114. See Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237 (1934).
115. See, e.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951);
Graves v. Corbin, 132 U.S. 571, 584 (1890) (under separable controversy
test).
116. See Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941) (Supreme Court would realign parties even though it had denied certiorari
on this issue at an earlier portion of the litigation).
117. See Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237 (1934).
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But again, in each of these cases, lack of jurisdiction appeared
on the face of the record, even if it did not appear with much
clarity to the parties themselves. A similar situation exists
where the parties assume that the case is one for a three judge
court when under the law it is one for a single judge or vice
versa."1 " In all these situations the defect in jurisdiction exists
on the record and they are all properly within the Mansfield
rule. These are the cases currently cited by courts and writers
to sustain the broad proposition that jurisdiction may be raised
at any time. 1 9 It seems clear that they do not sustain any
itself occasionally
such proposition, though the Supreme Court
20
states the rule with equal breadth in dicta.
In addition to the fact that the Supreme Court has kept
itself within the Mansfield-Hartog rules, it has again and again
21
formulated the rules in terms of a record-appearing defect.'

The Court will dismiss "if the record discloses that the lower
court was without jurisdiction,' 22 but otherwise the matter is in
the trial judge's discretion. The conclusion to be drawn from
all this is simply that the Court has followed a consistent pattern
in adhering to the Mansfield-Hartog rules. The dicta in Morris
are dead, as they always were.
But the law of the Supreme Court is not always the law in
practice. Although most of the courts of appeal-as well as the
Supreme Court' 23 -have held that jurisdictional facts can be
admitted, 124 and although the bulk of cases in the courts of appeal are cases consistent with the narrow Mansfield-Hartog
118.

See United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226 (1938); United States

v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435 (1936).
119. See, e.g., 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PAcTicE
(criticizing the rule, but stating it broadly).
120. See cases cited note 110 supra.

0.60(4) (2d ed. 1964)

121. See, e.g., Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303

U.S. 283 (1938); Parker v. Ormsby, 141 U.S. 81 (1891); Stevens v.
Nichols, 130 U.S. 230 (1889); Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888);
King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U.S. 225 (1887); Continental Ins.

Co. v. Rhoads, 119 U.S. 237 (1886); Hancock v. Holbrook, 112 U.S. 229
(1884).
122. United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 436 (1936).

123. See cases cited note 96 supra.
124. See, e.g., Di Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d
Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Townsend, 185 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1950); Young v.

Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1949) (alternative holding); Murphy
v. Sun Oil Co., 86 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1936); United States v. Wilson, 78
F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1935); Vincent v. United States, 76 F.2d 428 (D.C.
Cir. 1935); United States v. Ellison, 74 F.2d 864 (4th Cir. 1935); United
States v. Kiles, 70 F.2d 880 (8th Cir. 1934). See also Jackson v. Southern
Ry., 317 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1963); Harlee v. City of Gulfport, 120 F.2d 41
(5th Cir. 1941).
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rules,125 a few cases seem to have applied a broader rule. Most
notable of these is Page v. Wright126 which is usually cited for
the proposition that a jurisdictional objection can be made at
any time. 27 In Page plaintiff pleaded diversity by alleging his
Florida citizenship and by alleging on information and belief,
defendant's Kentucky citizenship. The defendant answered and
admitted "that this court has jurisdiction of the parties hereto,
and of the subject matter hereof."' 28 The case then proceeded
to judgment on the merits in favor of plaintiff, whereupon defendant's counsel suddenly discovered that he had "overlooked"
the little matter of diversity of citizenship and that his client
was not, as he had admitted, a citizen of Kentucky at all, but a
citizen of Florida. He thereupon moved to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction, alleging that no diversity existed. The trial court
denied him leave to file an amended answer and denied him
leave to file the motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court was bound to entertain the
objection and hear testimony on the jurisdictional issue. One of
the court's alternative reasons for this ruling was based squarely
upon the ground that jurisdictional issues could be raised at any
time. The appellate court thought that Hartog was overruled by
the dicta in Morris. The subsequent decision in Mexican Cent.
Ry. v. Pinkney, which clearly returned to the Hartog position,
puzzled the court, but was distinguished on rather meaningless
grounds.129 This holding in Page v. Wright is the clearest de125. The following cases, by no means an exhaustive list, are consistent with the narrow rule in Mansfield, although most of them have
been cited at one time or another, for the broader proposition that jurisdictional issues can be raised at any time: Thompson v. United States,
291 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1961); Resnick v. La Paz Guest Ranch, 289 F.2d 814
(9th Cir. 1961); Ambassador East, Inc. v. Orsatti, Inc., 257 F.2d 79 (3d
Cir. 1958); La Fever v. United States, 257 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1958);
Parmelee v. Ackerman, 252 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1958); Reconstruction Fin.
Corp. v. Riverview State Bank, 217 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1954); Lee Wing
Hong v. Dulles, 214 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1954); Hospoder v. United States,
209 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1953); Zank v. Landon, 205 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1953);
Martyn v. United States, 176 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1949); Orth v. Transit
Inv. Corp., 132 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1942); Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1941); Farr v. Detroit Trust Co., 116 F.2d 807 (6th
Cir. 1941). See also cases cited note 124 supra.
126. 116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940).
127. See, e.g., ALI, STUny or m Disiox OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE Am FEDERAL COURTS 106 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, April 19,
1965).
128. 116 F.2d at 450.
129. The Seventh Circuit thought that, although the Pinkney case
gave discretion to the trial judge to refuse to accept an amended answer
asserting the jurisdictional defect, the trial judge was still required to
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parture from the Mansfield-Hartog rules in modern times. And
even Page v. Wright has some qualifications, for the court took
pains to offer two alternative holdings. First, it said-or at
least implied-that the defendant could admit jurisdictional
facts, but held that his answer here had not done so because it
was couched in conclusory rather than factual terms. 5 0 Second,
the court brought the case within the Mansfield-Hartog rules by
holding that the record did not affirmatively support jurisdiction;
plaintiff had alleged defendant's Kentucky citizenship only on
information and belief, and this was an insufficient record showing of jurisdiction. Although there seems no reason why this
allegation, interpreted in the light of defendant's answer, is not
sufficient to show jurisdiction, if one grants the court's premise
that it does not, the decision is in accord wth Mansfield.
Among the cases commonly cited by writers on the subject,
only one other court of appeals decision goes beyond the MansfieZd-Hartog rules. Albert v. Brownell,131 a decision of the
Ninth Circuit, is perhaps understandable in the light of the
court's comments on rehearing, where it intimated that its decision was in reality based upon the merits and not upon a jurisdictional issue at all.132 The plaintiff sued claiming title to
property seized by the Alien Property Custodian. To recover,
she was required to show that she was neither an enemy nor an
ally of an enemy. She alleged that she was not. The government submitted certain affidavits and moved for summary judgment on the merits. The trial court gave summary judgment
for the government, but on appeal the court held that a judgment
upon the merits could not be rendered until the jurisdictional
hear a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. If this is correct,
the Supreme Court was engaging in meaningless formalism in deciding
Pinkney. This, of course, is not impossible, but there seems no reason
for a gratuitous presumption. Furthermore, it overlooks the real principle upon which Pinkney was clearly decided, namely, that the defendant "was not entitled to present any objection to the jurisdiction of
the court over the principle cause . . ." unless he did so timely. Huntington v. Laidley, 176 U.S. 668, 678 (1900).
130. Plaintiff's argument is predicated upon the premise that
the defendant "specifically admitted the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint." This is an overstatement of defendant's
admission. Defendant's admission was that the court had jurisdiction. Nothing was admitted regarding the factual allegations
of the complaint upon which jurisdiction was claimed.
116 F.2d at 451. "The answer of the defendant conceding jurisdiction
amounted to no more than consent. . . ." Id. at 453.
131. 219 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1954).
132. Id. at 605, n.6, noting that summary judgment was improper
because "plaintiff also claims with some apparent merit that there were
other genuine issues of fact . . ."
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facts had been proven. Since the plaintiff had not proved her
allegation that she was neither enemy nor an ally of one, which
was considered jurisdictional, 133 the court remanded and vacated
the judgment. Itreasoned that since the parties could not consent to jurisdiction, the jurisdictional facts had to be proved.
The decision is so fantastic that it virtually defies comment. In
the first place, it seems contrary to the earlier decision of the
same circuit that jurisdictional facts can be admitted. 134 In the
second place, it seems to challenge the validity and certainly the
effectiveness of Federal Rule 56, which provides for summary
judgment. This is so, since there are always jurisdictional facts
to be proved, and since in the Albert case no admission would
make this proof unnecessary. Finally the decision is squarely
contrary to the Mansfield-Hartog rules and to accepted practice.
These decisions cannot be justified on the basis of Rule 12
of the Federal Rules, although it is often cited in support of the
broad proposition that jurisdiction can be attacked at any time.
Rule 12(h) provides in effect that all issues must be raised by
answer, or before answer by motion. If they are not thus raised,
they may not be raised later. The rule then provides an exception where the issue is one of subject matter jurisdiction. On
this issue, the rule provides that "whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that a court lacks jurisdiction
35
of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. '
The Advisory Committee made it clear that Rule 12(h) goes no
further than the 1875 statute, 36 and that statute, as already
shown, requires the trial judge to dismiss only when the defect
is timely raised or when it appears on the face of the record.
The same conclusion results from a consideration of the
rule's specific reference, before the 1966 amendments, to Rule
15 (b) .137 Before the amendments, Rule 12 (h) concluded, imme133. As is so often the case, the alleged jurisdictional defect is not
properly labeled jurisdiction at all. Id. at 604.
134. NLRB v. Townsend, 185 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1950).
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
136. See 2 MooRE, FEDERAL
135.

PRAcTIcE f 12.01(24) (2d ed. 1964). As
to use of committee notes in construction of the rules, see id. at 1 1.13 (2)
(2d ed. 1964).
137. The 1964 proposal of the Advisory Committee for amendment
of Rule 12(h) eliminates the reference to Rule 15(b), which in the present rules literally refers jurisdictional as well as other issues to the
discretion of the judge under 15(b). The proposed amendment is:
"(3) Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action." The committee comments make no mention of this
portion of the amendments. 34 F.R.D. 371, 373 (1964).
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diately after reference to tardy jurisdictional objections, by stating that the "objection. . . if made at the trial, shall be disposed
of as provided in Rule 15 (b) . ...

13-1 Rule 15 (b) then expressly

left the question of amendment of pleadings to the discretion of
the district judge. Clearly, this meant that the district judge
could reject belated amendments to pleadings that would raise
jurisdictional issues. Although this reference to the rule of discretion has now been eliminated, the Advisory Committee's notes
do not indicate any intent to affect the point made here.
Therefore, the effect of Rule 12(h) is to confirm rather than
to overrule the Mansfield-Hartog-Mexican Cent. Ry. limits on

tardy jurisdictional objections. This appears to leave the aberrant decisions of the courts of appeal without support.
Perhaps to all this, it should be added that there is no real
question of constitutionality involved in foreclosing jurisdictional issues at an early stage of litigation. Due process no
doubt requires a fair opportunity to present jurisdictional issues, but there is no reason to suppose that it requires any more
opportunity than is required on an issue of venue or jurisdiction
of the person. It is true that the federal constitution limits
jurisdiction of federal courts to certain specified cases, such as
those involving diversity, and if a federal court decides a case in
which there is "really"'139 no diversity, it is in a sense transcending constitutional limits upon federal power. Nevertheless,
since the Constitution did not prescribe any particular method by
which jurisdictional issues would be determined, the drafters no
doubt intended that courts would pass on the issues of jurisdiction and that they would do so by ordinary procedures. The
Judiciary Act of 1789140 contained at least one clause that had
the effect of foreclosing a tardy assertion of jurisdictional objections,' 4' and the Supreme Court early in its history held that
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h).

The rule was so amended in 1966.
139. Of course, a judge seldom knows what the facts "really" are;
he knows only what he, as a fallible being finds them to be, and the
Constitution undoubtedly did not demand infallibility. See Currie,
Mutujality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAr. L, REV. 281, 315 (1957); Dobbs, Trial Court Error as an Excess of

Jurisdiction,43

TEXAS

L. REV. 854 (1965).

140. 1 Stat. 80 (1789).
141. Section 12 provided for removal to federal court by either
party of land title disputes where either party relied upon a grant of
land from a state "other than that in which the suit is pending ..."
It then provided that "neither party removing the cause, shall be
allowed to plead or give evidence of any other title than that by him
-stated as aforesaid .... ." This seems to mean that the party removing
is bound by his own jurisdictional allegations,
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jurisdictional objections could be raised only by a plea in abatement except where the defect in jurisdiction appeared on the
face of the record. 142 The Court has also held that jurisdictional
facts may be admitted by the parties, 143 and has promulgated a
number of rules that in fact, if not in form, foreclose the raising
of tardy objections to subject matter jurisdiction.144 The short
of it is that no one should suspect a constitutional issue lurking
in the background; the issue is purely an issue of civilzed and
efficient administration of justice.
2. The Meaning and Limits of the Mansfield-HartogRules
Once it is agreed that jurisdictional objections can be foreclosed at early stages of litigation, much as other issues can be,
it becomes necessary to point out the limits and significance of
such a rule.
In the first place, the rule is not merely a rule that- binds
parties by their admissions of jurisdictional facts, although certainly they are so bound. 45 What the Mansfield-Hartog rules
say is that a jurisdictional objection may not be tardily raised
unless the defect in jurisdiction is apparent on the record, or
jurisdiction is inadequately alleged. As often as not, jurisdiction
is a question of law rather than one of fact, and when this is so,
if there is no jurisdiction, it will appear on the record as a matter of law applied to admitted facts. It is likewise true that a
proper allegation of jurisdiction ought to have at least some factual element in it; it ought to allege, for example, diversity of
citizenship, and not merely "that this court has jurisdiction."
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not based its holdings on
distinctions between fact and law. If the plaintiff alleges the
bald conclusion that the court has jurisdiction and the defendant
does not attack that conclusion timely, a tardy attack need not
142, Smith v. Kernochen, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 198, 216 (1849).
143. See cases cited note 96 supra.
144. For example, the Supreme Court has approved a number of
rules fixing the time as of which jurisdiction is to be judged, or has
limited the manner in which it may be judged. A plaintiff's prayer for
relief controls in determining the jurisdictional amount, unless to a legal
certainty he cannot recover that amount. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COuRTS
§ 33 (1963). In form, this postulates standards for judging jurisdiction;
in fact it means that the plaintiff cannot show that his claim is "really"
worth less than the jurisdictional amount. Similar rules apply concerning citizenship; it is judged as of the time the suit is commenced, and
a subsequent change in citizenship will not affect jurisdiction, even if
a party "really" moves to disestablish diversity. See WarIGH, supra, § 28.
145. See cases cited note 124 supra.
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be permitted. Only if facts in the record show that the conclusory allegation is wrong, or probably wrong, 146 is there any
requirement that the defendant be permitted a tardy jurisdictional objection as of right. Thus in Di Frischia the defendant
probably could have shown facts that would have demonstrated
as a matter of law that no diversit-y existed. But, having admitted generally that it did exist, he was denied the right to do
so belatedly. The point seems obvious enough. Yet it is precisely the point at which the Seventh Circuit left the trail in
Page v. Wright,147 when it treated the problem as one of judicial
admissions and held that only specific facts could be admitted.
That is not, however, what the Mansfield-Hartog rules say. The
basis for foreclosing the issue of jurisdiction is not so much that
the parties have admitted jurisdictional facts as it is that procedural rules require timely assertion of jurisdictional objections, whether those objections are couched in terms of legal
conclusions or factual assertions. Only when neither pleadings,
proof, nor admissions show any assertion of jurisdiction at allor when, notwithstanding such an assertion it is clear that jurisdiction is absent-is the trial judge required to hear a tardy jurisdictional objection.
If all this is correct, the rule permitting tardy jurisdictional
objections is considerably more limited than is generally thought.
Yet it is broad enough to do considerable harm, and certainly it
is broad enough to protect the courts against collusive assault on
their dockets by unethical attorneys. Collusion need not be
tolerated under the Mansfield-Hartog rules because the trial
judge always has discretion to permit a belated attack on his
jurisdiction. If he suspects collusion, he should no doubt act at
any stage of the case to investigate it in an appropriate hearing.
In a case where no collusion exists, he may still entertain a
tardy objection and permit amendments and proof to sustain it,
and again, no doubt, would ordinarily do so if the objection comes
at a reasonably early stage of the litigation so that there is little
or no prejudice to the opposing party. 148 This rule of discretion
is a good one, though it seems commonly misunderstood.
146. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939), may support the
view that an improbable conclusory allegation of jurisdiction is insufficient.
147. 116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940).
148. See, considering elements affecting judicial discretion in permitting tardy amendments, Donnici, The Amendment of Pleadings-A
Study of the Operation of Judicial Discretion in the Federal Courts, 37
So. CAL, L. REv. 529 (1964).
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In addition to this discretion, the trial judge may be obliged
to permit a tardy objection, not only where the record affirmatively shows, without amendment, a jurisdictional defect, but
also where the jurisdictional defect is so serious that even a
collateral attack would be permitted. Under the bootstrap principle, it is said that a trial judge normally has the power to
determine his own jurisdiction, and that after judgment is rendered, his decision, even a tacit or implied one, is res judicata,
so that no objection to his jurisdiction can be made in a collateral action. 149 But under this rule there are exceptions in
special cases. If the policy against the judge's acting in such a
case is a strong one, a collateral attack may be permitted in
spite of the bootstrap principle.'5
Now obviously when the
jurisdictional objection is the kind that would be heard even on
collateral attack-in another case-the trial judge should also
hear it when it is made belatedly in the original suit. Thus if,
in a suit against the sovereign, the plea of sovereign immunity is
not timely made, courts may properly permit a belated plea of
immunity,' 5 ' since such an objection could be made collaterally
in a second action in any event.
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Although trial judge's discretion is an entirely adequate bulwark against collusion, the Mansfield-Hartog rules are too severe
in not leaving the entire matter to the trial judge's discretion.
They compel him to entertain a tardy jurisdictional objection
whenever the jurisdictional defect appears on the face of the
record. If parties could always know what jurisdictional law is,
this might be fair enough; but whether a court has jurisdiction
is quite often uncertain. In some cases it appears that jurisdiction exists, but a new judicial decision at a later date may show
that appearances were wrong. Something like this happened in
Finn' 3 where the plaintiff, a Texas citizen, sued a Texas insurance broker and two non-Texas insurance companies. The insurers removed the action to federal court under Section 1441
(c) of the Judicial Code on the theory that, as to them, there was
a separate and independent cause of action stated, even though
149. See cases cited note 12 supra.
150. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942). This is an oversimplified statement and certainly not definitive, but it is sufficiently
accurate.
151. Hospoder v. United States, 209 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1953), was a
situation of this sort, although the court did not rely on this point in
entertaining the jurisdictional issue.
152. United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506
(1940).
153. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
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the individual defendant was nondiverse. The plaintiff objected
to removal, but his objection was overruled. Trial resulted in a
verdict for the plaintiff against one of the removing insurance
companies. The Supreme Court held that, even though the insurer had removed the action to federal court, the jurisdictional
issue could be raised belatedly to its advantage. The case was
remanded because the Court concluded that no separate and
independent cause of action had been shown against the diverse
insurers, and that absent such a separate cause of action, there
was no removal jurisdiction, since the nondiverse individual defendant's presence destroyed diversity. This is extremely bad
law that no high-minded talk of states' rights or limited judicial
power can obscure. 5 4 Nevertheless it is law authorized by
Mansfield, because the jurisdictional defect appeared on the
face of the record, even though it may not have been very apparent to anyone but the Supreme Court. 55
The Mansfield rule, though narrower than usually thought,
requires the kind of judicial action that leads-quite understandably-to public contempt for the law that a democratic society
cannot afford. In conception, the Mansfield doctrine may be judicious; in practice it is merely iniquitous. There is no reason
why it should not be overruled, since it is not a constitutional
doctrine. It would be quite sufficient to deny all tardy objections to jurisdiction, unless the trial judge in his discretion saw
fit to permit them. There is certainly no need for a distinction
between jurisdictional defects appearing on the face of the record and those that can be shown only by introducing new
amendments or new testimony. Doubtless, however, the modernization of Mansfield is a dim prospect at best, and perhaps
one should be content if courts come to realize that Mansfield,
as bad as it is, is still a quite limited doctrine. There is, however,
hope of legislative change both on the state and federal level,
and this hope is worth brief comment.
154. There is usually talk of "judicial statesmanship," cf. HART &
719 (1953), or
of "avoiding offense to state sensitiveness," Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l
Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941), as if states were like sulky children, demanding work they do not want simply to prevent others from having
it.
155. The rule in Finn so narrowed the grounds for removal under
the "separate and independent claim or cause of action" test that in
the only cases left removable, there is a serious doubt as to the constitutionality of the statute as construed. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964). See
also W iGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 39 (1963). It seems clear that no lawyer
could have foretold a view of the statute that would have raised serious
doubts about its constitutionality.
WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL SYSTEVI
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III. THE COMING LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The preceding discussion has shown that the judicial system
-at least in the federal courts-is not quite so archaic as it is
reputed to be. Except in the Mansfield situation, parties are not
entitled as a matter of right to raise jurisdictional issues belatedly. But, as also shown, even the Mansfield rule produces some
egregiously bad results, justifiable only on a radical view of
"states' rights" in the judicial sphere. Two major changes by
way of legislative reform are in sight, and may affect the problem substantially within the near future.
The American Law Institute has drafted, at the suggestion
of the Chief Justice, a proposed revision of the federal judicial
code.15 6 The Institute's proposal, in statutory form, is that "no
court of the United States shall consider, either on its own motion or at the instance of any party, a question of jurisdiction.
. . ." after trial is commenced or there is a disposition upon the

merits. 157 Of the four exceptions recognized, the principal one is
that jurisdiction may be considered after trial Where there is
collusion between adverse parties on jurisdictional points and
where a party could not reasonably have raised the jurisdictioha
issue at an earlier stage. 58 The proposal is a major step in the
right direction. When applicable, it clearly overrules the Mansfield doctrine, for, after commencement of the trial, the court is
told it may not consider the jurisdictional issue, and there is no
exception made where the defect in jurisdiction appears on the
face of the pleadings.
This proposal, good as it is, is not entirely satisfactory. The
prohibition against raising jurisdictional issues begins at the
commencement of the trial. Prior to trial-unless the statute of
limitations has run, in which case there is a special provision 5 9presently existing rules would apply. This" means that before
156. See ALI, STUDY or

T=E DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE

AnD FERAL COURTS (Official Draft, 1965).

157. Id. at § 1308 (Official Draft, 1965) (diversity jurisd if6i)'
1386 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1966) (federal question). The latter has not
been officially approved by the Institute and was included in -the 1966
Tentative Draft to indicate the "present views" of the reporters and their
advisors.
158. Id. at § 1308(4) (Official Draft, 1965); § 1386(4) (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1966). Jurisdictional issues may also be considered after trial
is commenced where the court has previously deferred resolution of the
question and where the "question arises on appeal . . . of a decision
with respect to such question not rendered contrary to the provisions of
this section . .. ."
159. Id. at § 1308(b) (Official Draft, 1965); § 1386(b) (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1966).
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trial is "commenced" the judge would have discretion to permit
an amendment attacking his jurisdiction if the jurisdictional
facts were adequately pleaded (Hartog), but that he would be
required to hear a jurisdictional objection if the jurisdictional
facts had not been properly pleaded or if the objection to jurisdiction were apparent upon the admitted facts (Mansfield). This
means that so long as the statute of limitations has not run the
jurisdictional issue can be raised where it is apparent from the
record up until the day of the trial-or perhaps even on that
day, depending upon when one regards a trial as commencing. 10
Since a number of states do not permit their statutes of limitations to run while an action is pending, even if it is pending in
a court without jurisdiction,161 the statute might never run so
long as the case pends. Under such circumstances, if the federal
case did not come to trial for five years, the defendant might
wait five years (less a day) to raise his jurisdictional objection.
If the congestion time in state court is also five years, a plaintiff
might be forced to wait ten years to have his action heard on the
merits. Of course this is a deliberate example of an unusually
bad situation, but it serves to indicate the kind of result the
Institute's draft would permit. Perhaps it would be preferable
to eliminate Mansfield, not merely from the time trial commences, but from the time of the answer or the first motion, or
in a removed case, after a given time period.
The Institute's proposal is also subject to another objection.
There would be a considerable advantage in giving the trial judge
discretion, even after commencement of trial, to entertain jurisdictional objections thus extending Hartog's rule of discretion.
In view of the lifelong habits of judges, it may be a good idea
not to provide such discretion initially, since many judges would
undoubtedly exercise it in favor of hearing belated jurisdictional
arguments. But ultimately, there ought to be room for dismissal at relatively late stages of a case where the jurisdictional
160. The confident use of the "commencement of trial" standard by

the American Law Institute suggests that there is some tradition indi-

cating at what point this occurs. Id. at § 1308(a) (Official Draft, 1965);
§ 1386(a) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1966). Perhaps there is, but if so, I
am ignorant of it and other lawyers may be also. Is the trial "commenced" when the case is called, when the attorneys announce ready,
when it is scheduled on the calendar, when a jury is empaneled, or when
the judge takes his seat? See Berri v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 2d 856,
279 P.2d 8 (1955) (discussing two lines of authority). The present
draft recognizes that, in addition to the trial commencement cut-off,
jurisdictional issues should not be considered after prior-to-trial disposition of the case on the merits.
161. See materials cited note 78 supra.
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objection is one that is truly serious and where dismissal will
not prejudice any party. It is barely possible, for example, that
a dismissal ought to be granted even belatedly if it is discovered
that the litigation is within the2 exclusive jurisdiction of the
6
National Labor Relations Board.

The Institute's draft seems, therefore, both too broad and
too narrow. Once trial has commenced the proposed section
leaves no place for a belated consideration of jurisdictional objections that may be truly important; on the other hand, it
makes possible the most unjust sort of tardy attacks on jurisdiction, so long as they are made before trial is commenced.
The second legislative change in sight affects the state judicial systems-which perhaps need reform even more than the
federal system. Several states have now adopted' 6 the unified
court system, which somewhat resembles the system under the
English Judicature Acts,

64

and which postulates a single court

for the state with various divisions to which particular cases are
assigned. This revolutionary system eliminates altogether the
sprawling mass of inferior courts common in state judicial systems. Since a single court is created for the state, there is
virtually no problem of jurisdiction. If suit is filed in the wrong
division of that court, it is still filed in the only court available
and there is no question of a belated attack on jurisdiction if
any division of the court has jurisdiction. Only if the suit is of
a kind committed to an administrative agency or one over which
no court of the state would have jurisdiction, is any jurisdictional
point put in issue at all.
This is not the place to expound upon unified court plans.
It is enough to say that such plans are considerably more far
reaching and potentially more effective for good judicial administration than the limited reforms suggested by the ALl. And,
of course, they go far beyond the present rules that limit jurisdictional objections in the trial judge's discretion.
Perhaps in the distant future even these radical systems will
prove insufficient. Even if the ALI reforms are adopted and
even if all states some day adopt a unified court system, there
will remain a great gulf between that power which belongs to
162. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959), indicating something of the importance attached to the Board's

exclusive jurisdiction.

163. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 9 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-1 to
-401 (Supp. 1965), particularly §§ 7A-240, 7A-257.
164. Supreme Court Judicature of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66. See

HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGrISH LAW

638-45 (6th ed. 1938).
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the state courts and that which belongs to the federal. There
will remain the omnipresent possibility that a state court judgment is void because the case was within exclusive federal jurisdiction,' 65 and the same possibility that a federal judgment will
be void because the case was within exclusive state jurisdiction.
A similar gulf -will exist between courts and administrative
agencies. 166 Viewed in this perspective, the rules existing today
that deny belated jurisdictional objections in many instances, are
obviously insufficient, and even the reforms proposed by the
ALI and the unified court schemes are modest. Perhaps some
day it will prove desirable to unify ;he state and federal courts,
to the extent at least that free transferability of cases between
them can be made.. 67 For the moment, the modest reform proposals will be a useful step.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It has generally been stated that objections to jurisdiction of
the subject matter may be raised at any time. This is correct,
however, only in two situations: if the record does not show
jurisdiction (or shows that jurisdiction is absent), the objection
may be made at any time; and an objection to the jurisdiction
of the appellate court hearing the case can be made at any
time. 68 State courts 6 9 and many lower federal courts 170 appear
165. Federal jurisdiction is exclusive in several areas, and this
often creates judicial problems in which there is a good deal of wasted
motion. See, e.g., Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d
Cir. 1955).
166. This too frequently requires-or at least produces-bizarre results. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman, 348 U.S. 511 (1955),
held that a federal court could not enjoin a state court's usurpation of
jurisdiction vested exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board,
.since a federal court could issue an injunction only to protect its own
jurisdiction and it had no more jurisdiction than the state court.
167. This is not to suggest certification of questions to state courts,
as was done under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (Supp. 1961), at the urging
of Justice Frankfurter in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207
(1960). This practice has been an abysmal failure, as would be expected by any but the academic mind. Tlhis is very different, however,
from transferring an entire case from federal to state courts, or vice
versa, where the original court lacks jurisdiction.
168. The law is quite clear that, as distinct from a tardy objection
to trial court jurisdiction, an objection to appellate court jurisdiction
may be made at any time. Obviously, however, an objection to the
appellate court's jurisdiction cannot be made in the trial court and can
-hardly be described as tardy when urged for the first time after appeal
is perfected. A large number of cases state this rule, e.g., Shanferoke
'Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 293 U.S. 449 (1935);
Stoudenmire v. Braxton, 299 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1962).
169. Many state courts have not yet accepted the bootstrap principle,
and where they do not, of course, they permit not only tardy direct
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to assume that jurisdictional objections may be urged at any
time, not only in these, but in any other situation. The correct
rule, however, is that if the record shows jurisdiction, by allegation or admission of the parties as to jurisdictional facts, the
trial judge may refuse to hear a jurisdictional objection urged
after an answer is filed to the merits. In addition, the bootstrap
principle should preclude a jurisdictional attack launched after
a final judgment, and rules concerning law of the case may
preclude such attacks after an appeal and remand. There is
nothing unconstitutional about any of these rules, even though
they tend to controvert deep-rooted assumptions.
It remains true, however, that a great many cases must be
dismissed because after a trial on the merits a losing party discovers as a matter of law that there is no jurisdiction. This is
the law today as approved by the United States Supreme Court
and generally accepted everywhere in this country. Nothing prevents judicial reform of these rules except traditional judicial
inertia and perhaps a misconceived notion, surely inherited from
the Middle Ages, that it would be insulting for federal courts to
try cases "belonging" to state courts. In the case of state courts,
nothing prevents judicial reform of these rules but inertia and
a common lawyer's inclination to make the law as unreasonable
as possible. Since there is no indication of immediate judicial reform, however, the ALI proposals for the federal courts
and the unified court system proposals for the state courts
should be adopted (though perhaps with modifications) as quickly as possible.
attacks, but collateral attacks as well. A number of these cases are
cited and discussed in Dobbs, Trial Court Error as an Excess of Jurisdiction, 43 TExAs L. Ru. 854 (1965). On the other hand, many of the
state court decisions go no further than the Mansfield rule. See, e.g.,
Mayhew v. Mayhew, 376 S.W.2d 324 (Tenn. App. 1963). And some
merely say that the courts can or may dismiss for want of jurisdiction
upon a belated attack. E.g., Masone v. Zoning Bd., 148 Conn. 551, 172
A.2d 891 (1961); Landry v. Cornell Constr. Co., 87 R.I. 4, 137 A.2d 412
(1957).
170. District court decisions are not often contrary to the MansfieldHartog rules, because those rules recognize the power of the district
judge to hear tardy jurisdictional objections in his discretion. However,
the district judges uniformly appear to feel compelled and not merely
permitted to hear belated objections. See, e.g., Ambassador East, Inc.
v. Orsatti, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Pa. 1957), rev'd on other grounds,
257 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1958); Mills v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 83 F.
Supp. 240 (W.D. Mo. 1949). Many of the district court decisions are,
even so, consistent with the Mansfield-Hartog rules, in that the defect
in jurisdiction is apparent upon the face of the record. See, e.g., Fugle
v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mont. 1957); Clemente Eng'r Co.
v. Deliso Constr. Co., 53 F. Supp. 434 (D. Conn. 1944).

